RISK
What can still go wrong
A deal has two endings and both are written before it opens. Everything below is something that can go wrong inside them, with the line of the contract it comes from. None of it is financial advice.
01
The collateral can be worth nothing
If the borrower does not come back, the lender keeps the tokens and only the tokens. They can be worth less than the ETH the lender paid, and they can be worth zero.
02
There is no liquidation, in either direction
The contract reads no price, from an oracle or anywhere else. It will never seize a borrower's collateral when the market falls, and for exactly the same reason it will never step in to protect a lender when it does.
DealVault.sol:56
03
Non-recourse cuts both ways
A borrower who walks away owes nothing afterwards and is pursued by nobody. A lender left holding a token they did not want has nobody to pursue either.
04
You are trusting the token, and the allowlist
Collateral has to be an ERC-20 the vault has been told to accept. Two of the accepted findings, F3 and F4, are ways a hostile or non-standard token can strand a deal, and that allowlist is the entire mitigation for both.
DealVault.sol:352
05
A listed deal can be repriced before it is funded
The fee and the grace surcharge are frozen into a deal at the moment it is funded, and nothing can move them after that. Before then the owner can change the fee within 0.10% and 2.00%; cancelling the listing is the remedy, and F5 documents it.
DealVault.sol:389
06
9 owner functions, none of which can move your funds
The owner can pause new listings, set the allowlist, move the fee and the surcharge inside their caps, raise the caps, and sweep the protocol's own accrued fees. None of those is a path to locked collateral or to a funded deal's ETH. The whole list, with line numbers, is on the proof page.
07
The contract cannot be patched
There is no proxy, no upgrade path and no rescue function of any kind. That is what makes the guarantees above worth anything, and it also means a bug found later cannot be fixed in place.
DealVault.sol:25
08
It was attacked, and not everything was fixed
An independent adversarial suite found 8 things: 1 critical, now fixed, 2 fixed in total and 5 accepted with reasons. The report is published verbatim rather than summarised.
09
Coming back late costs more, and then stops being possible
After the deadline a borrower has 24 hours to reclaim at the buyback price plus the surcharge, all of which goes to the lender. When that window closes the lender can take the collateral and the borrower's choice is gone.
DealVault.sol:644
The full list of owner powers and the test numbers are on the proof page, and the review itself is at the findings. Generated from contracts/ at 70f9806.